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CIVILIAN SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVISTS IN
THE ARAB SPRING AND BEYOND: CAN
THEY EVER LOSE THEIR CIVILIAN
PROTECTIONS?
INTRODUCTION

T

he Arab Spring has brought great change to the Middle
East. While a series of protests and violent revolutions
supplanted old regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya,
Bahrain was rocked by protests and a civil war still rages in
Syria.1 New communications technologies such as Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter, as well as the global proliferation of cell
phones, have been perceived as indispensable tools to organize
protests,2 galvanize public support,3 incite armed rebellion, and
seek the support of allies and the international community.4
Dissidents’ use of modern social media technology for these
purposes can pose a real threat to an established regime, so
much so that the military will try to stop these activities

1. Interview by Celeste Headlee with Abderrahim Foukara, Washington
Bureau Chief, Al Jazeera Int’l, & Maren Turner, Executive Director, Freedom
Now,
in
Washington
D.C.
(Oct.
2,
2012),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/2012/10/02/162154681/syria-bahrain-still-feel-arabspring-aftershocks.
2. Thomas Sander, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s role in Arab Spring
(Middle East Uprisings), SOCIAL CAPITAL BLOG (May 23, 2012),
http://socialcapital.wordpress.com/2011/01/26/twitter-facebook-and-youtubesrole-in-tunisia-uprising/.
3. Though there were several previous self-immolations in Tunisia, Ryan
asserts that the use of social media to spread video of the event is what
caused the incident to garner attention from the wider Tunisian public and
the traditional media. Yasmine Ryan, How Tunisia’s Revolution Began, AL
JAZEERA
(Jan.
26,
2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.ht
ml.
4. See Richard A. Lindsey, What the Arab Spring Tells Us About the Future of Social Media in Revolutionary Movements, SMALL WARS J. (Jul. 2013),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-the-arab-spring-tells-us-about-thefuture-of-social-media-in-revolutionary-movement. Fitzpatrick notes that
social media can be used to garner support from international partners. See
Alex Fitzpatrick, Social Media Becoming Online Battlefield in Syria,
MASHABLE (Aug. 9, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/08/09/social-media-syria.
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through cyberwarfare5 or direct action against the dissidents
using such social media technology.6
A dissident’s use of social media presents great potential to
alter the military balance of an engagement, as it can be used
to directly or indirectly recruit fighters and encourage military
defections.7 Dissidents could also use social media to document
abusive actions by the regime,8 express political views or aspirations incompatible with those of the regime, garner sympathy and material support from the international community, or
otherwise aid a military or political victory over the regime.9
These activities, while potentially harmful to the regime’s military and civilian government, could be characterized as free
expression, an attempt to alter only the political situation,10 or
even journalism.11 In spite of such protections, a besieged regime may wish to either silence social media activists or target
them as though they were enemy military forces.12
5. Fitzpatrick, supra note 4.
6. Kristen McTighe, A Blogger at Arab Spring’s Genesis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/world/africa/ablogger-at-arab-springs-genesis.html?_r=0.
7. Social media, such as YouTube, could be used for this purpose. However, more traditional radio devices were actually used for this purpose in documented reports. This article documents members of the armed opposition
encouraging defection, but this activity could just as easily be undertaken by
civilians. See Erika Solomon & Douglas Hamilton, It’s a Walkie-Talkie War
April
4,
2012,
on
Syrian
Frequencies,
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/04/us-syria-radioidUSBRE8330E420120404.
8. Jennifer Preston, Seeking to Disrupt Protestors, Syria Cracks Down on
Social Media, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2011, at A10.
9. SEAN ADAY, ET. AL., BLOGS AND BULLETS II: NEW MEDIA CONFLICT AFTER
THE
ARAB
SPRING
20–22
(2012),
available
at
http://www.usip.org/publications/blogs-and-bullets-ii-new-media-and-conflictafter-the-arab-spring (detailing how outside political or military pressure
may make victory for the opposition more likely).
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19, 25, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 79, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
12. This can be accomplished by manipulating the content of the post, discrediting it, or blocking it. Fitzpatrick, supra note 4; Christopher Williams,
How Egypt Shut Down the Internet, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 28, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8288
163/How-Egypt-shut-down-the-internet.html.
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Under international law, a regime can only target civilians
with military force if the civilian has surrendered his or her
protections by “taking direct part in hostilities.”13 Although it
seems that many regimes have and will continue to use their
military, paramilitary, and other state organs to target civilians regardless of international law,14 a regime has the right to
repel an insurrection and defend itself against combatants or
civilians who have truly lost protection by aiding combatants.15
This was demonstrated in Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi’s
orders to attack armed civilians were within his regime’s right
of self-defense, but orders to attack civilian protestors were
contrary to international law.16 In order to balance the rights of
the regime to properly defend itself and the rights of a civilian
to lawfully express him or herself, it is imperative to define the
line between a social media activist who has lost civilian protection and one who has not.17
Two competing approaches have developed to determine
when a civilian has lost their protection from military targeting
by “taking direct part in hostilities.”18 The first is the Protocol I
Test, developed by the International Committee of the Red
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 51, sec. 3.
14. See Libya: 10 Protestors Apparently Executed, ALERTNET: A THOMSON
REUTERS
FOUND.
SERVICE
(Aug.
19,
2011,
12:30
AM),
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/libya-10-protesters-apparently-executed.
15. Sarah Joseph, Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, CASTAN CENTER
FOR
HUM.
RTS.
L.
(Mar.
18,
2011),
http://castancentre.com/2011/03/18/humanitarian-intervention-in-libya.
16. Id.
17. Keck articulates the idea that international law seeks to strike a balance between military necessity and ensuring humanitarian protections. A
state’s right to self-defense, which gives rise to military necessity, must be
based on permissible goals, however. Trevor Keck, Not All Civilians are Created Equal: The Principle of Distinction, the Question of Direct Participation
in Hostilities, and Evolving Restraints on the use of Force in Warfare, 211 Mil.
L. Rev. 115, 131 (Spring 2012); The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains the right to freedom of expression, though it notes that
freedom may be curtailed only to the narrowest extent possible for national
security and public order needs. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 10, art. 19.
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 51, sec. 3; Douglas Moore, Twenty-First Century
Embedded Journalists: Lawful Targets?, ARMY LAW., July 2009, at 18–21.
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Cross (“ICRC”).19 This Test requires that the civilian act to
cause military harm through an action designed for the purpose of causing such harm.20 The civilian’s actions and the
harm must also be linked directly within a single causal step.21
The second approach, the Functionality Test, evaluates the civilian based on the military importance of the civilian’s function to the faction that the civilian is supporting.22
This Note will argue that neither the Protocol I Test nor the
Functionality Test adequately balance a social media activist’s
right to free expression with a regime’s right to self-defense,23
in light of the potential military advantages gained by using
social media.24 An ideal balance will allow the social media activist unlimited political expression, even if the regime is existentially threatened by it, while respecting the regime’s right to
target an activist who specifically endeavors to inflict serious
military harm. The social media activist is less likely to be protected under the more expansive Functionality Test, because
this test fails to assure adequate protections for the activist’s

19. See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notions of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: Adopted by the
Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February,
2009, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991 (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE].
20. Id. at 1025.
21. Id. at 996.
22. Dan Stigall, The Thickest Grey: Assessing the Status of the Civilian
Response Corps Under the Law of International Armed Conflict and the U.S.
Approach to the Targeting of Civilians, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 885, 896 (2010).
23. The United Nations Charter guarantees the right to national selfdefense. U.N. Charter art. 51.
24. Zambelis notes the military value of social media by writing that the
“FSA [Free Syrian Army] appears keen to compensate for its tactical and operational inadequacies by exploiting social media as a force multiplier.” Chris
Zambelis, Information Wars: Assessing the Social Media Battlefield in Syria,
COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER SENTINEL, Jul. 2012, at 19, 20, available at
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/information-wars-assessing-the-social-mediabattlefield-in-syria. The United States military uses information to degrade
an adversary military’s efficiency and as a standalone “nonlethal capability.”
These goals would seem to lend themselves to the employment of social media. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.30, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
1-1 to 1-4 (Apr. 2005); PRENTISS BAKER, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WITHIN
THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519576 (submitted to the faculty of Air War College).
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right to freedom of speech and association.25 The Protocol I Test
is much more likely to grant protection to a social media activist, but it almost universally prevents the regime from defending itself against the military harm that social media activists
can purposefully cause.26
This Note will then argue that the Functionality Test can be
adapted to adequately balance the rights of the regime with
those of the social media activists.27 The Functionality Test requires additional safeguards to ensure that regimes only target
social media activists in those rare instances where the activists intentionally pose a legitimate military threat.28 These additional safeguards will require that the activist exhibit an individual, subjective intent to cause military harm to the regime,29 and that the act not constitute part of the “general war
effort” by merely building military capacity.30
Part I of this Note will provide a background of civilian participation in conflict and the use of social media, both before
and during the Arab Spring, by examining the dissidents’ actions and the regimes’ reactions. This examination will focus
heavily on the situation in Syria, as its civil war is the closest
25. Stigall notes that the Functionality Test is more likely to allow for the
targeting of civilians. Stigall, supra note 22, at 896. Free expression and political harm should not result in the loss of civilian protection. INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020.
26. Michael Schmitt criticizes the Protocol I Approach as constraining a
military’s ability to respond to certain legitimate threats posed by civilians.
Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The
Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 725, 729 (2010) [hereinafter Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities].
27. International law generally recognizes the right to free expression,
association, and political views. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 10, art. 19. The right of a regime to protect itself in a legal
manner is not affected by the general character of the regime. Joseph, supra
note 15. However, doctrines like humanitarian intervention may be used to
address abuses in the conduct of the war or the government’s behavior in
general. See T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
28. Stigall notes that the Functionality Test could be interpreted in a
manner too expansive to constrain military action against civilians that
should be protected from targeting. He also observes that the Functionality
Test is more likely to allow targeting of civilians than other interpretations.
See Stigall, supra note 22, at 896–898.
29. Free expression and political harm should not result in the loss of civilian protection. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020.
30. Id.
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to a traditional intrastate armed conflict, 31 and dissidents using social media in such a conflict are more likely to cause military harm. Part II will address the current provisions and interpretations of international law that result in civilian dissidents who use social media, either losing or maintaining their
protection from targeting. Part III will analyze and evaluate
the different applications of social media activities that may
result in the loss of civilian protection in light of the different
interpretations of a civilian’s direct participation in hostilities.32 Part IV will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
each interpretation of direct participation and propose additional criteria for determining when a social media activist has
lost his or her civilian protection. These additional criteria will
seek to balance a regime’s right to defend itself from what
could be employed as a new type of military threat against the
legitimate rights of a social media activist.33
I. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Protection for Civilians
The right of the civilian population to be free from military
targeting has been evolving over the last 150 years.34 Following
the widespread civilian suffering of World War II,35 large segments of the international community drafted the final treaty
in the modern series of the Geneva Conventions to protect civilians, in addition to the soldiers, sailors, and prisoners of war
protected under previous Geneva Conventions, from certain
31. The conflict in Syria most closely resembles a traditional intrastate
conflict because the regime forces are engaged with several organized, armed
opposition groups and coalitions of such organized groups. See, Lina Sinjab,
Syria Crisis: Guide to Armed and Political Opposition, BBC (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003.
32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 51, sec. 3.
33. The United Nations Charter guarantees the right to national selfdefense. U.N. Charter art. 51; Joseph, supra note 15.
34. Protection of civilians was at first customary and began to be codified
by instruments such as the Hague Conventions of 1907. See Waldemar Solf,
Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 120–
24 (1986).
35. Keck, supra note 17, at 120–121.
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instances of undue harm during war.36 Within international
conflicts, states were obliged to offer certain protections to opposing armed forces, military objectives, and civilians actively
participating in hostilities.37 These included protections from
murder, summary execution, use as a hostage, torture, and
other inhumane treatments.38 The first and second additional
protocols to the Geneva Conventions explicitly protected civilians from military targeting, as long as they refrained from
participation in hostilities.39 The first additional protocol extended some of the Geneva Conventions protections to intrastate conflicts for the first time, though only within the context
of conflicts against colonial or apartheid regimes.40 The first
additional protocol conditioned civilian protection on direct, ra36. The protection of civilians was codified by the fourth treaty in the Geneva Conventions and was similar to the safeguards offered to the groups
shielded by the three previous treaties. For this reason, the enumerated protections are referred to as “Common Article 3” for their identical placement in
each treaty. Lori Hosni, The ABCs of the Geneva Conventions and their Applicability to Modern Warfare, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 137–138
(2007); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
37. Hosni, supra note 36, at 137–38 (citing Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 36, art. 3).
38. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 37, art. 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 37, art. 3; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 37, art.
3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, supra note 36, art. 3.
39. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
supra note 39, art. 1, ¶ 4; Hosni, supra note 36, at 143–45.
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ther than active participation in the conflict, as had previously
been the case.41 A second additional protocol extended the civilian protections of the first additional protocol to all internal
armed conflicts.42
B. Increasing Participation of Civilians in Warfare.
Concurrent with the development of greater civilian protections,43 civilians have become generally more involved in warfare, both as victims and as participants.44 The recent proliferation of intrastate conflicts45 has been accompanied by the increased suffering of civilians in such conflicts.46 The nature of
these conflicts seems to create a propensity for greater civilian
involvement in the fighting.47 This increased civilian involvement is likely due to the intermingling of regime forces, opposition forces, and civilians in close quarters and the greater like-

41. The treaty protections for civilians in intrastate conflicts were originally allowed for groups attempting to overthrow a colonial regime, occupation
from a foreign power, or an apartheid regime. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 1, sec. 4. Later, all internal
armed conflicts were covered. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 1; Michael Schmitt, Direct
Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict, in FESTSCHRIFT
FÜR DIETER FLECK 505, 507, (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter 21st
Century
Armed
Conflict],
available
at
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/humanrights/HUMR5503/h09/undervisn
ingsmateriale/schmitt_direct_participation_in_hostilties.pdf.
42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, supra note
39, art. 1.
43. See Solf, supra note 34, at 117–129.
44. See generally Andreas Wegner & Simon J. A. Mason. The Civilianization of Armed Conflict: Trends and Implications, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 835
(2008).
45. See generally Stephane Dosse, The Intrastate Wars, SMALL WARS J., 2
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-rise-of-intrastatewars.
46. The majority of the worst instances of civilian suffering are a result of
intrastate conflicts. OXFAM, PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN 2010: FACTS, FIGURES,
AND THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL’S RESPONSE, 2–3 (2011), available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/protection-of-civilians-in2010-09052011-en.pdf.
47. See Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 840–41, 843–46.
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lihood that civilians will be invested in the outcome of a more
local conflict.48
At the same time, warfare in general is being waged with
greater civilian involvement under the auspices of military supervision.49 Contractors and civilians directly employed by the
military are performing jobs that were once reserved for uniformed military personnel.50 Civilians often participate in conflicts through irregular militias51 or perform technical tasks for
an organized military such as Cyber Operations,52 maintaining
complex weapons systems,53 or preparing food for soldiers.54
48. Many factors may explain this increased civilian involvement in hostilities. Intrastate conflicts may afford the opportunity for civilians to participate in an intrastate conflict as a pretext for other opportunities, such as personal gain or prosecution of a vendetta against a certain group. Furthermore,
the parties to the conflict may have uncertain membership, with action undertaken in a “bottom up” manner where civilians will broadly undertake the
goals of a party on their own initiative. Id. at 843–44.
49. See generally Nathan E. Hill, Military Contractors–Too Much Dependence? (Mar. 15, 2008) (Strategy Research Project for U.S. Army War College),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479000.
50. Civilians have become increasingly involved in administering and
maintaining high technology military equipment such as command systems,
communications, and sophisticated weapons. Wegner & Mason, supra note
44, at 839 . Civilian contractors now routinely act as cooks, interpreters, security guards, and equipment maintenance workers. Mark Cancian, Contractors: the New Element of Military Force Structure, 38 UNITED STATES ARMY
WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY: PARAMETERS 63–64 (Autumn 2008), available at
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/08autumn/
cancian.pdf.
51. For an example of this phenomenon, see Paul Rodgers, Syria: the
Evolving Problem of Competing Militias, OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP (Feb.
2013),
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syria%20the%20evolvin
g%20problem%20of%20competing%20militias.pdf.
52. Cyber Operations include assuring security of computer networks as
well as using such networks to offensively assist military commanders. Cyber
Operations capabilities have been suggested as a tool of deterrence, similar to
nuclear weapons, and have been used for other national security goals, such
as sabotaging Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Zachary Fryer-Biggs, U.S.
Cyber Moves Beyond Protection, DEFENSE NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014 9:54 AM),
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140316/DEFREG02/303170013/USCyber-Moves-Beyond-Protection; DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CYBER OPERATIONS
PERSONNEL
REPORT
10-11,
14-15
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=488076.
53. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 838–39.
54. Rod Nordman, Risks of Afghan War Shift from Soldiers to Contractors,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1.
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Militaries are also taking on other activities that were either
formerly civilian in nature or did not exist in the recent past,55
such as Cyber Operations, to safeguard and attack computer
networks, and Information Operations, which are designed to
impact a party’s ability to collect, process, disseminate, and act
upon information.56 These developments have resulted in
greater civilian involvement in military operations as well as
the incorporation of arguably civilian activities into military
operations.57
The simultaneous trends of rising civilian involvement in intrastate conflicts and a generally increasing civilianization of
military tasks58 have collided with the growing protections offered to civilians during conflicts59 to cause even greater friction between legal protections and the reality of warfare.60 The
use of social media can accelerate this friction, as its use may
further muddle the difference between military goals, political
goals, and free expression.61
C. Use of Social Media in the Arab Spring.
Social media has been perceived as instrumental to the political and military effectiveness of the opposition and insurgent
forces in the Arab Spring.62 The genesis of the Arab Spring
55. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 837–38.
56. Information Operations are activities designed to “affect the ability of
the target audience . . . to collect, process, or disseminate information before
or after decisions are made.” Information Operations include Psychological
Operations which seek not only to affect other militaries, but also civilian
populations and governments, which are necessary to achieve military goals.
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13 INFORMATION
OPERATIONS, II-3 to II-4 (2006) [hereinafter JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13]; Wegner
& Mason, supra note 44, at 837–38; Fryer-Biggs, supra note 52.
57. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 837–38.
58. Id.
59. See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance on the
Notions of Direct Participations in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POl. 831,
887 (2010) [hereinafter Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity].
60. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 843–45.
61. Actors in the conflict are either political or military, but employ similar
means to use social media in the Syrian conflict. Zambelis, supra note 24, at
19.
62. See T.J. Waters, Social Media and the Arab Spring, SMALL WARS J.
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/social-media-and-the-

2014]

CIVILIAN SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVISTS

1217

movement is thought to have occurred in Tunisia when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself.63 He acted out of desperation after he was unsuccessful in securing the return of his
fruit and scale impounded by corrupt government officials.64
This act is often cited as the catalyst that unleashed protests
and rebellion across the region as the citizens of Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and other Arab countries yearned for
“dignity, justice, and opportunity.”65 The ensuing protests and
skirmishes with authorities were distributed throughout Tunisia via Facebook, until traditional media picked up the story
and further accelerated its distribution.66 News of the opposition’s activities and the regime’s repression were disseminated
by the various means of social media; that dissemination, in
turn, appears to have increased acts of protest against the regime.67 Although paramilitary and police forces68 were used
arab-spring. Some experts believe, however, that the impact of social media
in the Arab Spring may have been overstated and that additional study is
needed to draw definite conclusions about social media’s importance to these
movements. See ADAY, ET. AL., supra note 9, at 3–5.
63. This event is often cited as the spark that ignited the events in Tunisia, which in turn is cited as the immediate catalyst for the Arab Spring.
Salman Shaikh, Mohamed Bouazizi: A Fruit Seller’s Legacy to the Arab People,
CNN
(Dec.
17,
2011,
9:23
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/16/world/meast/bouazizi-arab-spring-tunisia/;
Ryan, supra note 3.
64. Hernando De Soto, The Real Mohamed Bouazizi, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec.
16, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/16/the
_real_mohamed_bouazizi.
65. Shaikh, supra note 63.
66. Social media is given great credit for spreading news of this event, as a
similar event that was not widely reported failed to spark widespread civil
action in Tunisia. Ryan, supra note 3.
67. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were used to spread news about the
opposition’s and regime’s activities. These sources even fed information to
traditional television news outlets. Ryan, supra note 3.
68. Customary practice indicates that police or paramilitary forces can be
considered armed forces, thus their members are considered combatants, if
they independently meet the criteria to be considered an armed force. It is
arguable that this practice is confined to international conflicts, as it is not
mentioned in Protocol II, which deals with a broader scope of intrastate conflicts than Protocol I, though examples given by the ICRC of activities, such
as the enforcement of a nation’s laws, are not analogous to traditional military action. International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of
INT’L
HUMANITARIAN
L.
DATABASE,
Armed
Forces,
CUSTOMARY
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule4 (last visited Oct. 25,
2012); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
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against the protestors, the military itself seemed to act against
the regime.69 This suggests the possibility that the use of social
media may have served to recruit widespread military support
for the revolution. It is entirely possible, however, that this
movement was purely political, and the military simply declined to intercede as the president had ordered.70 The usage of
social media was aimed at organizing protests and disseminating information about the regime.71 These activities generally
involved political mobilization against the government and
lacked a military component.72
During the conflict in Syria, the Free Syrian Army used social media to implore members of the regular Syrian military to
defect and join the Free Syrian Army.73 The defections that fol-

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 43. Membership in the armed forces, however, is a
predicate to being considered a combatant—as distinguished from a civilian—in international conflicts. International Committee of the Red Cross,
Rule 3: Definition of Combatants, CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.
DATABASE, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3 (last visited Sep. 14, 2012); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art 43; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 1.
69. Ellen Knickmeyer, Just Whose Side are Arab Armies on, Anyway?,
POLICY
(Jan.
28,
2011),
FOREIGN
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/28/just_whose_side_are_arab_a
rmies_on_anyway.
70. The motivation for the military’s refusal to intercede and obey the
President’s order to fire on the protestors is not clear. This refusal and the
withdrawal of the military, however, have been described as “inexplicable.”
See David Kirkpatrick, Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the
Revolution’, NY TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A4.
71. The use of social media in Tunisia closely mirrored the use of social
media in Egypt. Sahar Kamus & Katherine Vaughn, Cyberactivism in the
Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted
the Balance, 14 ARAB MEDIA & SOC’Y, SUMMER 2011, available at
http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=769&printarticle.
72. See Knickmeyer, supra note 69.
73. YouTube and walkie-talkies were used by the opposition to try to induce defection by regime soldiers. Solomon & Hamilton, supra note 7; Saad
Abedine, Military Defectors Unite Under Free Syrian Army, CNN (Mar. 25,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/24/world/meast/syria-unrest.
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lowed chronologically74 have allegedly filled the ranks of the
Free Syrian Army while sapping the strength of the regular
Syrian Army.75 Furthermore, the Free Syrian Army used the
same social media to sow disunity and lower the morale of the
Syrian military.76 This type of action has the effect of building
up the military capacity of the Free Syrian Army while inflicting military harm on the forces of the regime.77
Social media activists used YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and
a host of other media to broadcast atrocities and other abuses
by the regime to the outside world.78 In Libya, social media users publicized violence by the regime, which was cited as a significant factor in galvanizing support for international military
intervention.79 Posting evidence of such violence can bridge the
gap between what happened on the ground during an armed
conflict and what the governments and citizens of the world
know when traditional international media is unable to document such violence through local reporting.80 In many instances, such international awareness galvanized the citizens of other countries to encourage their own governments to politically
pressure the regime committing the violence.81 Measures un74. The connection between media inducement and actual defection can be
inferred, but not documented. See generally Abedine, supra note 73; See Solomon & Hamilton, supra note 7.
75. Inside the Free Syrian Army, PBS NEWS HOUR (March 12, 2012),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june12/syria_03-12.html.
76. Zambelis, supra note 24, at 20.
77. The composition of the Free Syrian Army itself implies that defection
causes harm to regime forces as well as benefit to opposition forces. See Inside the Free Syrian Army, supra note 75; But, Zambelis characterizes the use
of social media to encourage defections from the regime to the opposition as
more important to reducing the morale and effectiveness of the regime than
the marginal shift in relative personnel strength. See Zambelis, supra note
24, at 20–21.
78. Libya: 10 Protestors Apparently Executed, supra note 14.
79. Aday writes that the use of social media in Libya generated a great
deal of discussion of the conflict. He is currently investigating how much, if at
all, such discussion can influence a foreign government to intervene. See Sean
Aday, Social Media, Diplomacy, and the Responsibility to Protect, TAKE FIVE
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://takefiveblog.org/2012/10/17/social-media-diplomacyand-the-responsibility-to-protect.
80. ADAY, ET. AL., supra note 9.
81. This “boomerang” phenomenon is when a population oppressed by a
regime causes citizens of another country to compel their own government to
pressure the regime. This political pressure may cause the regime to suspend
abuses or make it more difficult to commit them. ADAY, ET. AL., supra note 9

1220

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:3

dertaken by other governments to compel the regime to halt
violence sometimes result in subsequent military intervention.82
Dissidents’ use of social media during the Arab Spring has
shown that some uses of social media are capable of altering
the military landscape in addition to causing widespread political consequences.83 The recent uprisings of the Arab Spring also suggest several plausible scenarios in which social media
could be employed in future political and military uprisings,
such as organizing protests to distract the regime’s military
while opposition forces attack.84 Each of these scenarios has
different military and political consequences, and will therefore
inform a different legal result as to when the social media activist in question would lose his or her civilian protection.85
II. APPROACHES TO CIVILIAN PROTECTION
Under the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocols I and II,
protecting civilians in interstate and intrastate conflicts respectively,86 a civilian loses his or her protections from military
(citing MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS
(1998)).
82. See The Colonel Charges Ahead, ECONOMIST (May 17, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18400592.
83. See Zambelis, supra note 24
84. See generally Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s role in Arab Spring
(Middle East Uprisings), supra note 2.
85. Stigall notes that the interpretative framework chosen will lead to different results in situations with the same facts. See Stigall, supra note 22, at
907–08.
86. Civilian status is asserted simply by finding that the person is not a
member of the armed forces or a comparable opposition group in an armed
conflict. The most important factor in determining membership in the armed
forces is that the person is under the discipline of a responsible command.
The Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols are, however, unclear
about whether protections afforded to combatants extend to dissident armed
forces in an intrastate conflict. The ICRC states that the definition of armed
forces may be used to distinguish combatants from civilians for the purposes
of determining civilian status in an intrastate conflict. International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 3: Definition of Combatants, supra note 68; International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of Armed Forces,
supra note 68; International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 5: Definition
INT’L
HUMANITARIAN
L.
DATABASE,
of
Civilians,
CUSTOMARY
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule5 (last visited Sep. 15,
2012). Both additional protocols contain the same protections for civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities but apply to different types of conflicts. The
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targeting only by taking “direct part in hostilities.”87 There are
two primary interpretations of this standard which would allow
varying degrees of participation and support to an armed conflict before the civilian would lose his or her status.88 The Protocol I Test evaluates three formal elements of the civilian’s
actions in a manner that tends to conservatively preserve civilian protections89 whereas the more expansive Functionality
Test evaluates a civilian based on their military value.90
first protocol applies to international conflicts and a limited set of intrastate
conflicts while the second protocol applies generally to intrastate conflicts.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
supra note 11, art. 1, sec 4, art. 51, sec. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 1, sec. 2, art.
13.
87. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
supra note 39, art. 13, sec. 3. A temporal element must also be considered in
order to understand the requirement of direct participation in hostilities.
Many scholars believe that protection is lost only for the duration of such
participation as opposed to the idea that habitual participation will result in
a long term, total loss of protection. Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost, Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 660–62 (2010).
88. Moore, supra note 18, at 20–21. The Geographic, Functional, and Temporal Test is a third alternative test to determine direct participation in hostilities. This test considers “(1) geographic proximity of service provided to
units in contact with the enemy, (2) proximity of relationship between services provided and harm resulting to enemy, and (3) temporal relation of
support to enemy contact or harm resulting to enemy.” Albert S. Janin, Engaging Civilian-Belligerents Leads to Self-Defense/Protocol I Marriage, ARMY
LAW., July 2007, at 89 (quoting INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, INT’L & OPERATIONAL
LAW VOL. II, at I-10 (2006)). Stigall finds the Geographic, Functional, and
Temporal Test less expansive than the Functionality Test. Stigall, supra note
22, at 896. It should be noted that some believe the Functionality Test to also
consider the geographic and temporal proximity of military harm. Moore,
supra note 18, at 21 n. 215.
89. The International Committee of the Red Cross developed this interpretation because prior national guidance and adjudications on the subject did
not establish an applicable rule, but rather lists of behaviors, beyond physically fighting an enemy, that were classified as either direct or indirect participation. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 991–93; Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 705–08, 725,
729.
90. Moore, supra note 18, at 19–22; Stigall, supra note 22, at 896.
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A. Protocol I Test
The Protocol I Test was developed by the ICRC to clarify the
ambiguity of the “direct participation” requirement articulated
in the Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols.91 The
Protocol I Test requires three elements to find direct participation in hostilities under the Geneva Conventions.92
First, a “threshold of harm” must be reached wherein an act
is “likely to adversely affect the military operations or military
capacity of a party to an armed conflict” or an act that kills or
causes physical harm to a person or object protected from attack.93 This includes any harm, or potential harm, that may
have a negative effect on the military situation.94 Such harm is
broadly defined and only needs to deprive the regime of some
military advantage or diminish its military capabilities.95 The
threshold of harm does not account for actual severity of harm,
so long as some harm occurs or is likely to occur.96
Second, there must be a direct causal relationship between
the act and the harm suffered.97 The ICRC recommends considering several factors to parse direct causation from indirect
causation.98 First, in order to constitute direct causation, the
act must not be a part of the general war effort.99 This distinguishes those acts that indirectly support hostilities through
the general war effort, to include “war sustaining activities like
91. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 991–94; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 13, sec.
3.
92. Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59,
at 856–57.
93. The harm does not have to actually come to fruition but must only be a
likely result. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1016.
94. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, 71415.
95. The breadth of activity meeting this element is intentionally wide. It
was thought that the remaining elements would properly exclude indirect
participation. Still, “political, economic, and other advantages, such as impacting civilian morale” are not military harm though they may be indispensable to a war effort. Id. at 715–20.
96. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1017.
97. Id. at 1020.
98. Michael Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 26–27 (2010)
[hereinafter A Critical Analysis].
99. Stigall, supra note 22, at 894.
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manufacturing ammunition,” from those that actually apply
military force, like assaulting an enemy position.100 Activities
within the general war effort are those that build the general
military capacity and contribute to military victory by supporting and enabling the general capability to apply military
force.101 These include military production, maintenance of
transportation infrastructure, finance, and activities building
political support for the conflict.102 The causation element is,
however, broader than simply separating participation in the
general war effort from actions with more specific military consequences.103 This element also requires that no more than a
single “causal step” exist between the action constituting direct
participation and the harm inflicted.104 For instance, building
100. This idea tries to parse military logistics, industrial research, and other support into that which is part of a traditional war economy from support
tied to specific military operations which, while similar, shares a closer causal connection to the specific military harm in question. The ICRC actually
defines the general war effort as activities “objectively contributing to the
defeat of the adversary . . . beyond the actual conduct of hostilities.” This,
along with the argument that the line delineating direct participation should
fall somewhere between an individual engaged in combat and any person
with an indirect impact on the war effort, strongly implies that the dividing
line between the general war effort and the conduct of hostilities is the addition to or support of military capacity versus some application of force or
harm to the enemy. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020
n.113. Keck gives several other examples of this fine line. For instance, he
posits that transporting ammunition on a truck meets causation if it is destined directly for a unit at the front line, but transporting it to a port for further shipment would not meet the required level of causation. Keck, supra
note 17, at 142.
101. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020
102. The ICRC notes a difference between the general war effort and war
sustaining activities. The general war effort includes activities directly supporting the general military effort, such as production, design, and transport.
War sustaining activities are further removed and include activities associated with a nation at war such as political propaganda, finance, and maintenance of an economy geared to support the war effort. Id.
103. This test, however, stipulates that participation in the general war
effort will always be considered indirect participation in hostilities. Id. at
1019–20.
104. This act does not need to be indispensable to the harm, as direct participation could occur when a person provides extra help that is not strictly
needed to accomplish the goal. Schmitt further notes that the single step
could not have been literal, as gathering intelligence is several steps removed
from an attack, but still certainly direct participation. Deconstructing Direct
Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 725, 727–28.
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and storing an Improvised Explosive Device would be at least a
single causal step removed from the military harm incurred
when that weapon is employed by placing and detonating it.105
The direct causation element contains an exception for coordinated operations where the operation itself meets the causation
element.106 This exception will find direct causation if the individual act is both an integral part of the operation and undertaken specifically for that operation.107
The third requirement of the Protocol I Test is a belligerent
nexus.108 A belligerent nexus exists when the act in question
was “specifically designed [to cause the required threshold of
military harm] to support a belligerent party to the detriment
of another” party.109 A belligerent nexus differs from traditional
subjective intent, in that a belligerent nexus requires only an
evaluation of the purpose of the act itself, whereas a subjective
evaluation would focus on what the individual actually intended to accomplish through the act.110 Belligerent nexus is evaluated by inferring the purpose of the act from available objective
facts in each circumstance, and therefore imputes intent to all
participants in such an act regardless of their individual intent.111 For instance, a civilian that attacks a soldier to prevent
105. There is great disagreement about whether a civilian should be targetable when engaging in such an activity. Many military commanders believe that, although it would fail the Protocol I Test, the act is inherently hostile and is likely the only practical time to interdict the Improvised Explosive
Device. See id. at 725, 729.
106. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1022.
107. Actions like general military training, though integral to a certain operation, are not specific enough to a certain operation to amount to direct
participation. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note
26, at 729–30. Moreover, the examples given by the ICRC and its specific
language, such as indicating the location of forces, imply that collective military operations are limited to those achieving a specific and limited objective,
instead of broader strategic operations. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra
note 19, at 1023.
108. Watkin, supra note 87, at 657–58.
109. Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59,
at 857, 873.
110. A finding of belligerent nexus requires the intent to cause the threshold of harm referenced in the first element of Protocol I Test. INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1026–27.
111. Similar acts may have different motivations, such as inflicting military
harm on an enemy, enjoying criminal gain, or simply defending one’s self.
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 735–36.
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a rape would lack a belligerent nexus because the act would not
be designed to cause military harm, even though military harm
was caused through a purposeful act, regardless of the true intentions of the civilian.112 Conversely, a civilian would have a
belligerent nexus if he or she spontaneously joined a military
attack with the sole intention of looting the other side for profit.113 An individual would be excused from an act with a belligerent nexus only if he was unaware of his participation in the
act, such as a person unaware that they were transporting a
bomb.114
C. Functionality Test
The Functionality Test was predominantly developed by the
United States to interpret the idea of direct participation in
hostilities in a manner that acknowledged the military value of
civilians on the battlefield.115 The Functionality Test evaluates
the importance and level of support of a civilian’s military function to the achievement of a party’s military goals.116 This test
does not focus on the actual or potential harm caused to the
other side, but instead focuses on the value provided to the
armed forces by the civilian’s activities.117 Under the Functionality Test, the more essential a civilian is to victory on the bat112. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1027–28.
113. Id.
114. Keck, supra note 17, at 143.
115. The Parks Memorandum is a United States Army Judge Advocate
General memorandum that is credited with introducing the ideas of the
Functionality Test. The Parks Memorandum originally detailed the Functionality Test’s criteria to determine a civilian’s protection status when attached to an army. This document is geared towards evaluating the classification of civilians that accompany United States forces in overseas, interstate
conflicts, and, therefore, must be adapted to an intrastate conflict which may
feature less organized belligerent parties. See Moore, supra note 18, at 21
(citing Memorandum of Law, W. Hays Parks, Office of The Judge Advocate
General, U.S. Army, Law of War Status of Civilians Accompanying Military
Forces in the Field (May 6, 1999) (on file with The Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Law of War Memo].
116. Id.; Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
725–28. Adopting and expecting reciprocal treatment from the enemy can be
said to underlie the International Law of War. As such, this test should apply
to irregular militaries, including those in armed opposition during an intrastate conflict. Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 365, 368 (2009).
117. Moore, supra note 18, at 21.

1226

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:3

tlefield, the more likely they are to have crossed the threshold
for direct participation.118 Furthermore, under this test, direct
participation can be dependent on the particular strategy a
side chooses because the strategy determines the importance of
specific functions to military success.119 The Functionality Test,
therefore, is dependent on the circumstances of the individual
civilian, as well as his or her role in the overall war strategy.120
This test is attractive because it accounts for the fact that civilians can augment and perform functions that are not just indispensable, but constitute the heart of military operations,
even in modern armies.121
The Functionality Test also requires that the hostile activity
be in “direct support of combat operations.”122 Direct support is
determined by examining the alignment of goals and the integration of civilian and military activity.123 The definition of direct support is amorphous, but it seeks to include civilian activities that support soldiers in battle or a civilian’s action “in the
midst of an ongoing engagement.”124
118. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 906–07.
119. Stigall notes that, during the United States campaign in Afghanistan,
the strategy selected will affect how vital a civilian is considered under the
Functionality Test. The use of American civilians to build and repair infrastructure in Afghanistan may constitute direct participation under the Functionality Test, since such activity is viewed by the U.S. military as integral to
the overall military strategy. If the reconstruction, however, was undertaken
for purely humanitarian reasons concurrent with the war, American civilians
participating in such an effort would not directly participate in hostile acts
under the Functionality Test due to their unimportance to the military strategy. Id.
120. Keck, supra note 17, at 145.
121. Moore, supra note 18, at 21; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO/NSAID-00-115, DEFENSE LOGISTICS: AIR FORCE REPORT ON CONTRACTOR
SUPPORT IS NARROWLY FOCUSED 1-9, 13, 16 (2000), available at
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA377822.
122. This standard is intended to provide some protection from civilians
engaged in what is traditionally understood as the general war effort. It
seems to place a heavy focus on the geographical disposition of the civilian,
whereas the Protocol I Test seems to acknowledge that these categories are
driven more by the function of the civilian. See Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
123. Moore, supra note 18, at 24.
124. Id. At 21 n. 224 (quoting ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 484 n.14 (A.R. Thomas &
James C. Duncan eds., Supp. 1999). Moore implies that the idea of direct
support is related to the idea of activities in the general war effort through
examples, though he notes that guidance is not clear. See id. at 21 n.224.
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The Functionality Test also requires that the perception of
the enemy must be considered in order to determine how critical they believe the civilian is to the opposing side.125 The same
criteria used in the main Functionality Test should be evaluated from the point of view of the opposing party.126 This consideration provides some balance to the subjective and arbitrary
nature of the Functionality Test by considering the view of both
sides to a conflict.127
III. APPLICATION OF THE PROTOCOL I AND FUNCTIONALITY
TESTS TO THE ARAB SPRING
The different uses of social media during the Arab Spring
would result in different protections for civilians depending on
which test is used.128 The choice of applying either the Protocol
I Test or the Functionality Test can be dispositive in determining whether international law is able to best balance protecMoore also writes that the Functionality Test does “not condone targeting
civilians for general participation in the war effort, similar to Protocol I” but
allows targeting of those rendering direct support. This seems to adopt direct
support as an element of the test, and explain its relation to the general war
effort. See id. at 21. The definitions of direct support that Moore cites are not
entirely congruent with the general war effort as understood by the ICRC in
the Protocol I Test. Compare id. at 21 n.224, with INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE,
supra note 19, at 1020.
125. Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
126. This element should inject predictability into the test, as putting one’s
self in the shoes of the enemy should lead to more uniformity between what
each party believes is protected. See Law of War Memo, supra note 115, §3.
127. See id. §3.
128. Stigall notes that the choice of framework, when coupled with the facts
of the situation, will be dispositive in determining if direct participation in
the hostilities occurred. Stigall, supra note 22, at 898. It is unlikely, but possible, that social media activists would be considered combatants in an intrastate conflict if they could be found to be under a responsible command of a
recognized party to the conflict and under that party’s system of discipline.
This would only be found when the social media activist was integrated into a
quasi-military command structure and subject to its directions. See Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note
11, art 43; Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of Armed Forces,
supra 68; JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, at II-1. It is important to note, however,
that the increase in focus on Information Operations and Psychological Operations among established militaries reinforces the idea that dissemination of
information can be a military activity, especially when used as a supporting
effort in a military operation. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 24, at 1–7.

1228

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:3

tions of legitimate social media activity with a regime’s right to
self-defense in an internal conflict.129
A. Use of Social Media to Organize Protests that Threaten the
Regime.
In a situation where social media is used to organize and incite protests against a regime, as it was in Tunisia,130 neither
test would likely result in a finding of direct participation in
hostilities.131 Under the Protocol I Test, no threshold of harm
would be found, as the harm would not be of a “specifically military nature,”132 because any harm would be political.133 Causation likewise would not be found, as such a finding is directly
contingent upon a finding that the threshold of harm had been
met.134 Even if it were stipulated that the threshold of harm
had been met, causation would also fail, as providing the information to incite a protest would be several steps removed
from any specific military harm inflicted by the actual protestors.135 A belligerent nexus would also be lacking in this situation because a political protest is difficult to characterize as exhibiting an objective intent to cause the threshold of harm required by the first element of the test.136 In examining the actions of a social media activist organizing a protest, it would be
difficult to conclude that the activist’s actions were designed
with the purpose of causing the requisite military harm.137
129. Stigall, supra note 22, at 898; See International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 10, art. 19; See Joseph, supra note 15.
130. Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s role in Arab Spring (Middle East
Uprisings), supra note 2.
131. See generally Kamus & Vaughn, supra note 71. The use of social media
to incite political protests is analogous to events that took place during the
Tunisian revolution. See Ryan, supra note 3.
132. Threshold of harm is more arguable in Tunisia where protests pressured the regime to give up political power. Although the army was called,
but failed, to respond to requests for aid to the Tunisian regime―possibly due
to social media pressure―there was still no armed military conflict to be altered in that scenario. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1016.
133. Here, the harm was to pressure the regime to cede power in a political
sense. See Ryan, supra note 3.
134. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
719–20; See Watkin, supra note 87, at 658.
135. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1021.
136. Id. at 1021.
137. Jamie Williamson, Challenges of Twenty-First Century Conflict, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 457, 466 (2010).
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The Functionality Test also would fail to find direct participation in this scenario. Evaluating the status and importance
of a social media activist’s effect on the military would be moot
when his or her activities do not contribute to any military
goals.138 Though the Functionality Test is more liberal than the
Protocol I Test, it is still based on a civilian’s importance to the
achievement of military goals.139
B. Use of Social Media to Incite Protests that Aid Military Action.
Protests, informed and organized by social media, could be
used to distract or hamper regime forces in order to allow an
opposition attack.140 A protest could be deliberately organized,
or opportunistically exploited, by an insurgency to distract or
misdirect military forces during an armed attack.141
Under any of these circumstances, the Protocol I Test could
be used to find the threshold of harm because the protests divert military resources away from fighting in the concurrent
armed conflict.142 The military harm caused by distracting soldiers is not diminished by the possibility that protected political or other nonmilitary harm may result from the protest.143
Military harm under this test must be specific, but not exclusive, as implied by the ICRC’s finding that interrupting the
138. Moore examines a journalist who only begins to be considered under
the Functionality Test when the goals of the journalist and military align. See
Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
139. Id. at 24–26.
140. Although not an attack on a regime by an insurgency, the Benghazi
attack on the U.S. Consulate illustrates the plausible tactic of using a protest
as a distraction for a military assault. The genesis of the Benghazi Protests
that accompanied the simultaneous attack on the U. S. Consulate is not entirely clear. It is likely the protest was planned in response to an offensive
video, without knowledge of the impending attack; however, it is possible that
the protest was a planned distraction. See Scott Shane, Clearing the Record
on Benghazi, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012, at A16; More recent reports have
shown that the relationship between the protest and attack may be even less
clear upon further investigation. David Kirkpatrick, A Deadly Mix in BenTIMES
(Dec.
28,
2013),
ghazi,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0.
141. See Shane, supra note 140.
142. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1018–19.
143. Again, it is not clear what the motivation of the Benghazi protestors
was. Their goals may have been expressive or possibly even military. Scott
Shane, supra note 140; David Kirkpatrick, supra note 140.
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food supply could meet the threshold of harm, even though it
may disproportionately affect the civilian population.144
Even if the broad military threshold of harm element is met,
causation is extremely difficult to show. Here the military
harm is distracting the soldiers, which is directly caused by the
participants in the protest.145 Therefore, the social media activist’s action of inciting the protest would be at least one causal
step removed from the protestors’ distraction.146 Furthermore,
the ICRC guidance states that political propaganda is necessarily indirect participation, as it is part of the general war effort.147
Inciting, or even organizing, a protest to support an attack
could be considered an integral part of a collective military operation, and thus fall within the coordinated operations exception to the causation requirement.148 Such an argument would
misconstrue the purpose of the collective operations exception,
which is to ensure that causation is not excused simply because
some participants in a military operation do not independently
cause harm, but still help a collective unit inflict the required
threshold of harm.149 It would be an abuse of the causation ex144. Examples like interrupting food supply are stated not to meet the
threshold of harm unless they impair military operations or capacity. This
suggests that “specific” military harm does not equate with “exclusive” military harm, as the residual harm of that action could be to hurt government or
civilian operations. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1019.
145. See Keck, supra note 17, at 142.
146. Unlike Schmitt’s example of gathering intelligence, which could possibly be characterized as a single causal act with multiple steps, acts to incite a
protest are inherently indirect as they rely on the independent actions of discreet individuals instead of integrated collective actions to complete the hostile act. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26,
at 725, 727–28.
147. It may be possible to distinguish this situation from what the ICRC
thought of as political propaganda if it was done with the purpose of causing
specific military consequences, like diverting military forces. See
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020.
148. Id. at 1022–23.
149. This exception seeks to acknowledge that a modern military operation
includes many people who do not directly cause harm to the enemy. For instance a Forward Air Controller may not drop a bomb but may be necessary
to properly target the bomb. Andrew Walton, The History of the Airborne
Forward Air Controller in Vietnam, 2–3 (2004) (unpublished thesis for Masters of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA429021;
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1022–23.
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ception to consider an operation to be collective, when participants may not be aware that they are even participants in a
collective action. Thus, a social media activist who incites or
even organizes a protest is not part of a collective action with
the protestors and the collective operations exception is not applicable.150
A belligerent nexus could only be found, upon objective inspection of the facts, if the protest was designed specifically
with the intent to divert military resources away from an
armed conflict.151 In a situation where a protest was organized
in order to cause military harm, but the participants attended
to express political discontent, the Functionality Test does not
provide clear guidance.152 The ICRC states that civilians obstructing military activity while fleeing violence lack a belligerent nexus, while those blocking a road in order to obstruct
military operations exhibit a belligerent nexus.153 It is likely
that, in an unclear situation, the objective facts would be construed cautiously in order to ascribe the intent of the majority
of participants to the act as a whole.154 The outcome, however,
is far from clear.
It is important to note that a finding of belligerent nexus is a
description of the objective purpose of the act, not of any individual, and that such a finding would impute a belligerent
nexus onto the organizers and all participants in the protest.155
The Protocol I Test declines to find a belligerent nexus in extreme situations where a civilian is unaware of his or her part
150. This seems most analogous to the example of the training of military
recruits being considered indirect causation because the training was removed from the specific hostile action by intervening decisions, similar to the
way that protests are dependent on the individual decisions of the protestors.
See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 725,
729–39.
151. See Watkin, supra note 87, at 659.
152. The requirement is that the act be “specifically designed to cause the
required threshold of harm.” This does not mention that intent needs to be
exclusive. It is likely that “specific” has the same meaning as it does for the
threshold of harm. The report, however, does not explore examples of an act
being designed for two purposes. Experts compiling this report note that, if
specific intent is ambiguous, it cannot justify “split second targeting.”
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1022–27.
153. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1027–28.
154. Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59,
at 874–77.
155. A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 34.
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in hostilities, such as when a civilian drives a truck unaware
that he or she is transporting munitions.156 A civilian taking
part in a protest, without knowing that the protest is a pretext
for a military assault, could be analogized to a civilian being
unaware of his or her role in hostilities. That exception, however, is limited and seems inapplicable to situations where the
civilian is aware of their actions, but not aware of the greater
purpose of their actions.157 In such a case, the determination of
belligerent nexus is likely moot because the organizing activist
will retain civilian protection due to a lack of causation, as the
organization of a protest is several causal steps removed from
any military harm caused.158
Subjecting this scenario to the Functionality Test will render
a different outcome. Under the Functionality Test, the incitement or facilitation of a protest which diverts or misdirects a
regime’s military resources could be found sufficiently supportive of a military action to overthrow that regime to warrant the
loss of the instigators’ civilian protections.159 This would require a finding that the protest had a serious impact on military objectives, and that the social media activist was an important, high level catalyst in direct support of the protest.160
The regime’s agents might also claim that they subjectively
perceived the activist as a threat in order to reinforce the importance of the action, if the activist is involved in a large
demonstration.161 In such a scenario, because the activist assisted in mobilizing a large amount of demonstrators, the importance of his function would be quite high.162 Although this
test is highly dependent on facts, it is also highly subjective
and open to a great deal of interpretation,163 subject only to the
156. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1027.
157. See id. at 1027.
158. See Watkin, supra note 87, at 659.
159. Stigall suggests that military goals can also include winning the allegiance of the local population, which, while certainly a political goal, may also
be considered a military goal. This is analogous to the use of civilians to reconstruct Afghan infrastructure, which possibly meets the Functionality Test
due to that mission being critical to overall military goals. See Stigall, supra
note 22, at 907.
160. See id. at 896–97.
161. For an in depth explanation of the subjective criteria used to apply the
Functionality Test, see Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
162. See Keck, supra note 17, at 144–45.
163. Id. at 145.
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civilian’s functional level of support and his or her importance
to military goals.164 The Functionality Test does not limit itself
to the military significance of actions, as the Protocol I Test
does, but examines the civilian’s military role.165 The protestors
would likely retain protection because they would not, individually, be important enough, or contribute enough functional
support, to become military targets.166
C. Use of Social Media to Incite Military Defections from the
Regime.
Civilian social media activists may also attempt to cause defections from the regime’s military forces with the secondary
goal of augmenting the ranks of armed opposition groups, as
was the case in Syria.167 Under the Protocol I Test, defection
would meet the threshold of harm as the regime’s military capacity would be directly diminished by the removal of its soldiers from battle.168 Mere recruitment of fighters for the opposition, on the other hand, would fail to meet the threshold of
harm.169 This is due to the fact that the threshold of harm is
not met when the opposition increases its own military capacity
without independently causing military harm to the regime.170
Causation is difficult to demonstrate, as enticing or convincing a soldier to defect is, at least, a causal step removed from
the hostile act, especially because the defecting soldier’s action
is a choice independent from the enticement of the activist.171
Even if defection could be characterized as a collective action,
164. Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
165. See id.
166. Law of War Memo, supra note 115, §3.
167. In this story, it should be noted that documented attempts to encourage defection where undertaken by combatants of the armed opposition, not
by sympathetic civilian efforts. Solomon & Hamilton, supra note 7. The Syrian opposition has also attempted to encourage defections through YouTube,
though by a member of the Free Syrian Army and not an unaffiliated civilian.
See Saad, supra note73.
168. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
714–15. The threat of defection alone can have significant military consequences, such as grounding the air force for fear of losing planes to the opposing force. See Rod Nordland, Latest Syrian Defectors are from Higher Ranks,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A9.
169. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1018–19.
170. A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 27–28.
171. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020.
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enticement would not form an integral part of that action,172 as
defection is possible without such enticement. The normal causation element, as well as the collective operations exception,
could possibly be met if the social media activist and opposition
materially facilitated defection by providing safe passage or
some similar aid.
Belligerent nexus is entirely dependent on the existence of
facts indicating that the defection campaign was objectively
designed to harm the regime’s military, rather than build the
combat power of the armed opposition.173 This is because a belligerent nexus refers to the objective design of an act to achieve
a valid threshold of harm.174 A social media activist inciting defections would likely fail the Protocol I Test due to negative
findings of causation and belligerent nexus because the harmful action was causally remote and not conclusively designed
with the purpose to harm the regime’s military.
The Functionality Test would find the inducement of defections to be direct participation in a conflict, especially if the defectors joined the ranks of the opposition.175 The function of
causing defection and recruiting soldiers would seem to be of
the highest order in an internal conflict.176 This point is even
more pronounced as the Functionality Test does not require
that causation be limited to a single causal step like the Protocol I Test.177 Under the Functionality Test, the requisite level of
importance of a social media activist needs to be determined
based upon a factual examination of how instrumental the ac-

172. See A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 29–31.
173. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
736.
174. The elements of this test are cumulative; therefore, the succeeding
elements must refer to a valid preceding fact. If both a valid and an invalid
threshold of harm are found, but belligerent nexus is met for only the invalid
threshold of harm, direct participation will not be found. A Critical Analysis,
supra note 98, at 27.
175. Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
176. Recruiting fighters and drawing them from the enemy seems to be a
more vital function than civilian reconstruction was in the Afghanistan conflict discussed by Stigall. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 906–07.
177. The Protocol I Test requires causation within a single step while the
Functionality Test only requires the act be in direct support of operations.
Compare INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020, with Moore, supra
note 18, at 21.
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tivist was in facilitating defections.178 A finding on the military
importance must also consider the opposing regime’s evaluation of a social media activist’s importance.179 A regime’s evaluation would likely attach equal or greater importance than the
opposition’s evaluation, to regime soldiers defecting and joining
the ranks of the opposition. It is also important to note that a
social media activist would lose protection under this test by
either exclusively encouraging defections or exclusively recruiting fighters, as both activities are important elements of the
opposition’s military mission.180 Notably lacking is a requirement that the social media activist intend to affect the military
balance of power by causing defections and aiding recruitment.181
D. Use of Social Media to Acquire Foreign Aid for the Opposition.
Social media can also be used as a tool to document the abuses of the regime and the virtues of the opposition in the hope of
obtaining outside aid for the struggle against the regime.182

178. The importance of social media as a tool of Psychological Operations to
aid a military effort can be analogized to the importance of journalism as a
Psychological Operations tool. Moore explores if a journalist embedded with a
military unit would be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities. He
notes that when the military exerts sufficient control over the journalist and
the goals of the military and journalist align, then the journalists could possibly be targeted under the Functionality Test. See Moore, supra note 18, at
24–26.
179. Law of War Memo, supra note 115, §3.
180. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 896.
181. Moore requires that independent journalists be brought under military
control before they can pass the Functionality Test. This seems to be a special
case, however, as the activity in which such journalists play a role is a military controlled Information Operations campaign. Because this is described
as a plan integrating many types of information and disseminating it according to a mission specific plan, the goal could not logically be advanced without
some instruction, coordination, or facilitation by the military. Other activities
could possibly constitute direct participation under the Functionality Test
without such close integration with military goals. For examples see Moore,
supra note 18, at 21.
182. This website shows that the documentation of regime abuses may result in pressure for foreign governments to intervene or otherwise provide
aid. Geoffrey Mock, Desperate Reprisals, Documenting the Syrian Regime’s
Abuses, AMNESTY INT’L (June 20, 2012), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middleeast/desperate-reprisals-documenting-the-syrian-regimes-abuses.
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This aid may take the form of punitive action against the regime,183 efforts to deny the regime military advantage,184 direct
aid to the opposition,185 or even foreign military intervention
against the regime.186 Regardless of the aid secured by the
pressure created by social media activists, securing international aid could never be considered direct participation under
the Protocol I Test, although some elements of the test may be
satisfied. The threshold of harm would be met by some of these
forms of aid if they either adversely affect the regime’s military
capacity by denying them weapons and support or if they result
in the infliction of military damage by, for example, encouraging a foreign government to attack the regime.187 A social media activist who attracts international aid that results in the
arming or training of the opposition would fail to cause military
damage consistent with the threshold of harm, due to the fact
that building the opposition’s military capacity fails to inflict
sufficient military harm on the regime.188 There is, however, a
possibility that coercive economic sanctions could cause sufficient military harm to meet the threshold of harm, if military
capacity is sufficiently damaged.189
Causation will not be found when a social media activist garners international support to aid the opposition or harm the
183. E.U. Expands Sanctions, Moves Toward Oil Embargo, REUTERS (Aug.
19,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/syria-eu-sanctionsidUSB5E7IL02720110819.
184. Foreign supplies of weapons were intercepted en route to the Syrian
regime. Richard Spencer et. al., Britain Stops Russian Ship Carrying Attack
Helicopters for Syria, TELEGRAPH, June 19, 2012.
185. Weapons can be used to arm the opposition as they were in Libya. Rod
Nordland, Libyan Rebels Say They’re Being Sent Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2011, at A10.
186. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided international air
support to the Libyan opposition. Richard Spencer, Libya: Coalition Forces
Prepare Two-Pronged Blitz to Finish off Gaddafi, TELEGRAPH (May 28, 2011,
5:37
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8543
882/Libya-Coalition-forces-prepare-two-pronged-blitz-to-finish-offGaddafi.html.
187. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
715–20.
188. A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 27.
189. It seems possible to interpret the Protocol I Test to find military harm
through economic sanctions that diminish military forces. See INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 995–96.
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regime because such action is part of the general war effort and
more than a single causal step removed from the harm. First,
because the aid is supplied by another power with independent
volition, the provision of aid will necessarily be more than a
single causal step removed from any action by the social media
activist that may have caused it. The social media activist must
raise international awareness, the populace of the nation rendering aid must then exert pressure, the government of that
nation must decide to render such aid, and then the aid must
be delivered. Second, the social media activist’s attempt to acquire such international aid will be considered a part of the
general war effort because it is a high level, civilian government, wartime operation, similar to diplomacy or the purchase
of necessary military supplies.190 Furthermore, such aid is not
geared toward a specific operation, but to generally degrading
the regime’s military capacity or increasing the opposition’s
military capacity.191
Even if causation were found, a belligerent nexus is unlikely
to be found, as the social media activist’s campaign was likely
intended to induce the international community to inflict political, rather than military, harm.192 Belligerent nexus is especially problematic for economic sanctions, as it is probable,
again, that the enacting state pursued them in order to force
the regime to make political concessions rather than inflict military harm.193 It is difficult to ascribe a specific purpose to a
social media activist’s campaign to bring international attention to a conflict. It is more logical to assume that the activists
are attempting to secure whatever type of aid they can, not
specific aid for a single military operation.
In contrast, the Functionality Test is more amenable to finding direct participation for instances of social activism which

190. For examples of the application of the causation element of the Protocol I Test see id. at 1020.
191. Only in cases where an allied attack is coordinated with the opposition
could causation be direct, otherwise the opposition is simply helping to create
a broad political action through the participation of the ally. It is unlikely,
however, that the social media activist’s pressure would exhibit enough direct
connection to have caused such a specific attack. See id. at 1021–23.
192. See Keck, supra note 17, at 143.
193. Here some sanctions were targeted at specific members of the regime,
presumably to influence their decision making. E.U. Expands Sanctions,
Moves Toward Oil Embargo, supra note 183.
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result in international aid for the opposition.194 Securing the
aid of a major international power could prove decisive in altering the military balance in a conflict.195 The Functionality Test,
however, does require that an action be taken in “direct support” of combat operations.196 Because seeking international
aid is not directly aligned and integrated with the opposition’s
military goals, but instead aimed at broader political goals, the
Functionality Test would also fail to find direct participation in
hostilities due to a lack of direct support.197
IV. EVALUATION OF CURRENT INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES AND
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS.
The use of either the Protocol I Test or the Functionality Test
to determine when a civilian has lost protection through participation in hostilities does not adequately address the balance
between the social media activist’s right to free expression198
and a regime’s right to defend itself against a legitimate, internal military threat.199 Both tests function satisfactorily at the
extremes―prohibiting the military targeting of a political protest organizer or a social media activist who can help secure

194. Stigall notes that the Functionality Test is more expansive than the
Protocol I Test. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 896–97.
195. Securing the aid of a powerful ally, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, seems to have been decisive to the outcome of the conflict in Libya. Interview by Bettina Klein of Deutschlandfunk radio with Egon Ramms,
Retired General, Federal Republic of Germany (Aug. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.dw.de/nato-has-played-a-decisive-role-in-libya/a-15346089. Such
aid, however, pales in comparison even to a civilian who maintains a vital
weapons system. See Moore, supra note 18, at 21. Furthermore, it has been
suggested that influencing a civilian population can meet the Functionality
Test as being a critical function for victory, like influencing the Afghan population with reconstruction projects. Securing international aid seems no further removed from battlefield functions than influencing a domestic population to facilitate traditional military operations. See Stigall, supra note 22, at
906–07.
196. Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
197. For an example of the consideration of direct support in the case of
embedded journalists under the Functionality Test, see id. at 24–26.
198. International law protects rights of expression. International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 10, art. 19.
199. Joseph, supra note 15.
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general foreign aid.200 The Protocol I Test may fail to allow a
regime to defend itself when a social media activist is instrumental in encouraging defections or when that activist organizes a protest specifically for military advantage. The Protocol I
Test is generally too restrictive to accommodate targeting of
civilians that in some circumstances are performing important
and indispensable military functions that are too diffuse to
form a particular instance of specific military harm but which
may still be distinguished from the general war effort.201 On
the other hand, the Functionality Test has been criticized as
too malleable and arbitrary, conditioning direct participation
upon the subjective importance of a civilian’s role in a strategy
that may not be widely known.202 The Functionality Test also
fails to give adequate weight to the civilian’s individual intent,
which could lead to loss of protection for a social media activist
that unwittingly causes important military harm, such as organizing a protest that distracts regime soldiers, leading to an
opposition attack.203 The Functionality Test has further been
criticized for failing to provide a predictable, bright line where
direct participation ends and where indirect participation, like
financing, which is too far removed from hostilities under the
Functionality Test, begins.204
200. Social media could be one of the means used to create public pressure
on foreign governments to intervene in an intrastate conflict, implicating military consequences. See the Colonel Charges Ahead, supra note 82.
201. See Keck, supra note 17, at 145 (citing Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 737–38). The social media activist’s potential analogue, depending on exact activity, in an organized military is that
of an Information Operations or Psychological Operations specialist. It is likely that such activities could be traced to a specific military harm, as their
effects may be diffuse and cumulative. They are, however, employed on the
“tactical” level, meaning that they are targeted more specifically than just
being a part of the general war effort. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 24, at
2–3; The U.S. Army defines tactical as the “level of war at which battles and
engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives.” The
tactical level is differentiated from the Operational and Strategic level where
broad objectives and campaigns are achieved by a connected series of tactical
engagements. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION NO. 3-90,
OFFENSE AND DEFENSE 1 (2012).
202. Keck, supra note 17, at 145.
203. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
735–36.
204. Stigall notes that Afghan drug traffickers that financed the insurgency
may have been targeted. Stigall, supra note 22, at 897 (citing CHRISTOPHER M.
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A. Evaluation of the Protocol I Test
The Protocol I Test does not allow for the loss of protection
when a civilian traceably, but not directly, causes a specific instance of military harm under the “no more than one causal
step” standard.205 This is a helpful distinction in separating
true participation in hostilities from the general war effort.206
The distinction does not, however, allow for the fact that some
actions may not be direct, but still cause specific and traceable
harm, with the intent to cause diffuse military harm, in support of broad, rather than specific, military goals. For instance,
Psychological Operations are employed by modern armies to
degrade an enemy force’s morale and will to fight, not just
those defending specific objectives,207 whereas participation in
the general war effort involves activities like the production of
ammunition for general use.208 While ammunition could traceably be used to achieve a specific objective, it is inherently
building a general military capacity to be employed as needed
in later operations.209 Organizing civilian perceptions through
social media could be considered part of a general war effort,
like producing ammunition to build general military capacity,
or it could be considered an actual application of military capacity against the regime, albeit in a general, rather than specific, manner.210 Actions that could be analogized to a tactical
military application should, however, be considered direct participation as they are no longer a part of the “general war ef-

BLANCHARD, AFGHANISTAN: NARCOTICS AND U.S. POLICY 16 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf).
205. See Watkin, supra note 87, at 658.
206. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020.
207. The United States Army publishes extensive doctrine on how to use
Psychological Operations against civilian and military audiences to achieve
military goals or support traditional forces in achieving their military objectives. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 24, at 1–2 to 1–4.
208. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020.
209. Schmitt explains that employing capacity and, in some cases like constructing an Improvised Explosive Device, building capacity, should meet the
direct causation standard to allow a military to defend itself from such activities. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 727.
210. The ICRC does use production of propaganda as an example of an activity within the general war effort. The ICRC also notes, however, that
propagandists can lose their protection if they directly participate in hostilities. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1019–22.
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fort,”211 whether a social media activist’s efforts caused diffuse
military harm or harm to a specific target. Shaping public opinion to support a general, albeit tactical, military end is an accepted application of Psychological Operations or Information
Operations.212 Giving blanket protection to civilians who take
part in such activities creates a double standard, as a regime
that retains similar Information Operations and Psychological
Operations capabilities in its military would remain subject to
targeting by the opposition while a civilian engaging in such
activities could intentionally cause military harm without being targeted.213 The Protocol I Test would, however, extend civilian protection to Information Operations and Psychological
Operations activities by social media activists since they are at
least one step removed and arguably part of the general war
effort.214
The Protocol I Test’s strict direct causation requirement has
also been criticized more broadly because it fails to include civilians that make deadly and effective contributions to a conflict.215 Michael Schmitt criticizes the Protocol I Test because
211. Although not targeting a specific military objective, the use of social
media to cause a direct harm is more analogous to a tactical operation than
undertaking an activity to build capacity for a war effort through financing,
which is a traditional example of an activity within the general war effort.
Edward Linneweber, To Target or Not to Target? Why ‘Tis Nobler to Thwart
the Afghan Narcotics Trade Through Nonlethal Means, 207 MIL. L. REV. 155,
171 (Spring 2011).
212. Here goals such as shaping the public perception of the enemy and the
civilian population are seen as indispensable support to a military operation.
They can be geared generally toward promoting battlefield victory and are
much wider than supporting narrow military goals like capturing a specific
objective. See Moore, supra note 18, at 12; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 24,
at 1-1 to 1-4.
213. If the Protocol I Test is applied and found to exclude civilian Information Operations from direct participation in hostilities, members of the
regime’s armed forces would be targetable based solely on membership in the
armed forces. International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of
Armed Forces, supra note 68; See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at
1020.
214. Keck references the conservative approach that grants greater immunity to those more closely associated with the general war effort and in general
seeks to minimize findings of direct participation in hostilities. Keck, supra
note 17, at 131.
215. Schmitt writes that constructing an improvised explosive device or a
bomb vest for a suicide bomber would be examples excluded under the Protocol I Test’s approach to causation, but are still integral to causing the requi-
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activities, like building an Improvised Explosive Device, are
excluded because they are more than one causal step removed
from harm, while military commanders implicitly feel that such
bomb makers must be targeted, as targeting them is the most
effective way to interdict such weapons.216 Similarly, a social
media activist can only cause indirect harm, that is, harm more
than one causal step removed, because they merely enable, or
indirectly cause, such harm through the physical actions of
others, such as protestors or defectors.217
Furthermore, the Protocol I Test characterizes the activity in
question based on the objective purpose of its design, and can
impute a belligerent nexus to all participants without considering individual intent.218 This ascribes a belligerent nexus to all
participants in either spreading the message of the activist or
participating in a subsequent protest, provided that a belligerent nexus is found for the overall purpose of the activity and
the other elements of the test are met.219 Individual participants are excused from a collective finding of belligerent nexus
only when they “are totally unaware of the role they are playing in the conduct of hostilities” or the participants are deprived of freedom of action.220 This exception, however, is intended to be extremely limited.221 To fall into this exception the
protestor would have to be unaware that they were distracting
soldiers at all; ignorance that the protestors were distracting
soldiers to enable a military strike by the opposition would not
be sufficient for this exception.222 This is consistent with the
ICRC example, where the transportation of an explosive is only
site military threshold of harm. Schmitt criticizes limiting the consideration
of integral acts, more than one step removed from causing the threshold of
harm in all cases, not only in collective actions. See Deconstructing Direct
Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 725, 729–30.
216. Id. at 725, 729.
217. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1019–21.
218. Id. at 1025–29.
219. Schmitt distinguishes belligerent nexus from subjective intent by noting that children fighting for a belligerent party would lack subjective intent,
but still have a belligerent nexus due to the overall design of the act in question. This can be extrapolated to show that an individual lacking subjective
intent for any reason could foreseeably exhibit a belligerent nexus. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 735.
220. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1027.
221. See id. at 1027.
222. See id. at 1027.
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excused if the driver does not know it is an explosive, but the
same transportation presumably would not be excused if the
driver were aware of the explosive, and only unaware of the
purpose of the explosive.223 Based on this analysis, the Protocol
I Test is not suitable to situations involving social media activists because damage to the regime is discounted as indirect and
the belligerent nexus is imputed to all knowing participants no
matter their individual subjective motivations.224
B. Evaluation of the Functionality Test.
The Functionality Test is generally better suited towards
considering the rights of the regime, though at the expense of
the important rights of civilians. The Functionality Test recognizes that military damage which cannot be directly found
within a single causal step to cause a specific instance of military harm can still be traceably attributable to the civilian’s
action.225 This connection is important because a social media
activist could prove to be vital to military operations, and support those operations in a functionally significant way, if he
were to incite a protest that tied up a large military force or if
he were to cause military defections.226 Therefore the Functionality Test’s replacement of the Protocol I Test’s requirements
for threshold of harm and causation with an evaluation of the
value and gravity of the activity227 allows the regime greater
flexibility to take action against new military capabilities with
broad battlefield effects, such as the Information Operations of
a social media activist, without tying such action to a single
military objective.228 This would allow targeting of social media
activists that cause significant military harm by encouraging
defections. It would also address Michael Schmitt’s criticism of
the Protocol I Test’s threshold of harm; the Protocol I Test fails
to acknowledge that positively increasing the opposition’s mili-

223. See id. at 1027.
224. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
735.
225. See id. at 729–33. This test does not focus on the geographic proximity
of causation to actual military harm. See Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
226. See Keck, supra note 17, at 145.
227. Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
228. Watkin criticizes the Protocol I Test for limiting direct participation to
military harm caused at the tactical level. See Watkin, supra note 87, at 659.
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tary capacity necessarily harms the regime by activities like
securing fighters or arms through aid.229
The Functionality Test still suffers from inherent arbitrariness, as a social media activist can be targeted based on the
subjective importance of his or her activity.230 This concern is
partially addressed by the requirement that functionality and
importance be assessed through the eyes of the regime as well
as the perspective of the opposition.231 Adopting a standard
that is too strict, however, to respond to the necessities of modern warfare will prove unworkable and ultimately be ignored
as irrelevant.232
The Functionality Test has some glaring shortcomings when
applied to social media activism. First, the Functionality Test
does not examine intent because it was originally developed to
evaluate a civilian with a connection to an organized military.
The test assumes that the civilian in question is providing a
function with an obvious military goal, like repairing a valuable weapon,233 or is providing a service under the control and
direction of a military force towards a military goal, like a civilian conducting an interrogation to gather military intelligence.234 A civilian social media activist will not telegraph his
or her intent so readily, based solely on an examination of the
activity in question. Many participants in a protest organized
through social media will act based on motivations that differ
from the organizer’s original intent.235 These participants may
even be ignorant of the “designed” purpose of the larger act.236
Second, this test is too subjective to be predictable. A civilian
may not know how militarily important the regime thinks the
229. A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 28.
230. Keck, supra note 17, at 145.
231. See Moore, supra note 18, at 24.
232. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
699.
233. See Moore, supra note 18, at 24.
234. See Hill, supra note 49, at 13–14. The U.S. military’s use of this test
has been most developed in evaluating its own civilians. It is important to
note that the intent of these civilians is not really at issue as they voluntarily
associated themselves with the military. The example of an embedded journalist losing protection is controversial, but is, according to Moore, predicated
on the amount of military control and integration to which they are subject.
See Moore, supra note 18, at 21, 24–26.
235. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1025–29.
236. See id.
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civilian’s act is, and therefore will not have notice of whether
he or she can be targeted based on his or her activities.237
C. Suggested Improvements to the Functionality Test in the Social Media Context.
Because the Functionality Test better addresses the complexities of social media activism in the context of the Arab Spring,
its shortcomings must be addressed with additional safeguards.
The Functionality Test should be augmented with a requirement that the activist not only demonstrate subjective intent to
cause military harm, but also that his or her action not be a
part of the general war effort, in that the action does more than
merely build military capacity.238
A measure of intent should be required to safeguard against
the potential overreach of the Functionality Test.239 As the Protocol I Test’s idea of belligerent nexus fails to distinguish individual motivations for action, 240 subjective intent to cause military harm should be used in conjunction with the Functionality
Test to ensure that each targeted civilian intends to cause military harm in excess of protected political expression. This
would ensure that a civilian will not lose protection just because his or her social media activities―or activities incited by
social media―are incidentally and functionally important to a
military operation.241 This will also allow each individual involved in the act to be evaluated independently, in order to ensure that those not intending to cause military harm do not
lose their civilian protections.242
This standard may be difficult to administer during the chaos
of civil unrest, but would not be any more prone to error or
abuse than objectively divining the purpose of entire activities

237. Keck notes that the Functionality Test hinges on the importance of the
civilian’s activity. See Keck, supra note 17, at 145.
238. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
727.
239. Stigall holds the view that this test “is too broad to serve as a legitimate standard to safeguard civilians and far too malleable to legitimately
uphold the principle of distinction.” Stigall, supra note 22, at 912–13.
240. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1025–29.
241. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
735–36, for examples comparing subjective intent and belligerent nexus.
242. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1025–29.
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under the belligerent nexus requirement.243 The ICRC recognizes that a complex test to determine direct participation will
be difficult to administer, and thus recommends the use of caution and a presumption of protection if a civilian’s status is uncertain.244 Further in the context of social media activism, a
regime will likely have more time to carefully consider targeting a civilian. This is because a social media activist will likely
be removed in space and time from the military harm because
they are acting remotely to influence the actions of others.245
The subjective intent element should also consider whether
any military harm caused by a social media activist at the expense of the regime is in support of another party.246 The consideration of intent to support another party at the expense of
the regime makes clear that the hostile act should be intended
to support a group militarily opposing the regime. Inclusion of
such a consideration of intent will help to ensure that civilians
are not targeted for an act that only incidentally supports the
opposition, while allowing civilians who truly wish to aid the
opposition in their military struggle to be targeted.
There is a need for further safeguards to confine the loss of
civilian protections to cases where civilian actions are truly acting in support of a military objective. These safeguards can
protect a social media activist who is not providing true military aid by ensuring his or her undertaking is not within the
general war effort.247 The Functionality Test does require that
an action be in direct support of military operations, however,
that is not a standard suited to a diffuse intrastate conflict
where a social media activist’s efforts may not be integrated
with the opposition forces’ activities as required by this element.248
Although the Protocol I Test’s requirement for direct causation within a single causal step may be too confining for mod243. See id. at 1027.
244. Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59,
at, 875–77; INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1037–38.
245. See Solomon & Hamilton, supra note 7.
246. Melzer posits that belligerent nexus requires that the action be intended to harm one party while supporting another. Keeping the Balance Between
Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59, at 871–73.
247. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at
708.
248. See Moore, supra note 18, at 24, 21.
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ern warfare, its exclusion of activities supporting the general
war effort is useful in preserving the notion that some civilians
can generally support a country or faction at war without broad
swaths of a state’s civilian population losing their protections
from military targeting.249 Certain efforts mentioned by the
ICRC, like designing weapons, producing weapons, or maintaining transportation infrastructure, fit the traditional definition of the general war effort.250 The general war effort restriction should be slightly refined to encompass the building of
general military capacity, but exclude employing that capacity
in either a general or specific sense.251 Activities truly contributing to the general war effort deserve protection, but other
activities, though not necessarily specific military actions, may
result in specific military consequences, and therefore, should
result in lost protection even if causation is removed by several
steps, as in the case of an activist who generally causes military defections.252 This standard should adopt the Protocol I
Test’s exclusion of activities within the general war effort, instead of the Functionality Test’s wider definition of direct support. Adoption of the refined restriction on activities within the
general war effort would help ameliorate the dangers of overreach inherent to the Functionality Test.253 Moreover, this
standard would help to further distinguish the use of social
media to build general public support for a revolt from a more
particular use of social media to militarily affect the regime or
to achieve a particular military objective.
CONCLUSION
The widespread use of social media during the Arab Spring
represents the confluence of several developments in conflict.
249. Here, the general war effort should be understood as disregarding geographic proximity under the ICRC guidance. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra
note 19, at 1023.
250. Id. at 1021–22.
251. An example of building specific capacity would be to train or recruit
personnel for a specific military act, like to attack a specific building or position. It would also include a civilian that built an IED for a specific attack or
emplacement. A civilian that worked at a traditional munitions factory,
which built ammunition to support general military uses to be determined
later in the conflict would, however, build general military capacity. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 718–19.
252. See Solomon & Hamilton, supra note 7.
253. Stigall, supra note 22, at 911–13.
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Primarily, the Arab Spring illustrates an increase in intrastate
conflicts, 254 a proliferation of the use of social media in military
and political conflicts, 255 and an amplified importance of Information Operations in military conflict256 against the global
trend of increasing civilianization of warfare.257 These trends
create an environment where the traditional laws of war, and
their requisite protection of civilians, are increasingly outmoded.258 The use of social media in such internal conflicts strains
the current understanding of civilian protection and has the
potential to be used much like other weapons on the battlefield.259 Yet, because social media can also be used for protected
activities like political expression, careful evaluation is required before civilian protection can be stripped from social
media activists.260
The protection of civilians from targeting, except civilians
who take “direct part in hostilities,” is an essential cornerstone
of international law.261 Current interpretations do not, however, strike an acceptable balance between the concerns of a regime that is defending itself and the social media activist who
is exercising his recognized political rights.262 The Protocol I
Test adheres to a time when civilians were often considered
passive victims of warfare.263 As such, this test grants great
protections to the social media activist without regard to the
serious military impact they could have.264 The overly restrictive concepts of direct causation and belligerent nexus ensure
254. The author notes that conflicts, predominantly within states, have
generally increased during the twenty first century, and have continued that
trend during the Arab Spring. Malin Nilsson, The Trends in Armed Conflicts
Today, PEACE MONITOR (Oct. 12, 2011), http://peacemonitor.org/?p=142.
255. Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s role in Arab Spring (Middle East
Uprisings), supra note 2.
256. JOINT PUBLICATION 3–13, supra note 56, at II-1.
257. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 836.
258. See 21st Century Armed Conflict, supra note 40, at 510–12.
259. Zambelis notes that social media is used to inflict harm on the enemy
and act as a “force multiplier.” See Zambelis, supra note 24, at 19, 20.
260. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1026.
261. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 51, sec. 3.
262. Id. at art. 51, sec. 3; See Joseph, supra note 15.
263. 21st Century Armed Conflict, supra note 41, at 510–12.
264. Again, Zambelis notes how social media can be used to inflict harm on
a military organization. See Zambelis, supra note 24, at 19, 20.
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that it is almost impossible for a social media activist to lose
civilian protection.265 The Functionality Test recognizes that
civilians could become a legitimate target due to their importance on the battlefield and their indispensable military
functions.266 This test, however, lacks the necessary safeguards
to provide predictability and adequate protections to civilians
that do not intend to create a military advantage through their
actions.267 The Functionality Test acknowledges the value of
information activities in warfare and should be fortified with
safeguards, to ensure that social media activists are only targeted in the rare instances when they exhibit a subjective intent to cause military harm that is separate from the general
war effort.268
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265. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1016–22.
266. Moore, supra note 18, at 21.
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